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ABSTRACT 
Over the past decades there have been gradual shifts in fisheries governance in the Caribbean from one that is “top-down” and 
centralised to one that is “participatory” and devolved. This shift in governance comes from the recognition of the potential benefits 
to be gained from greater involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making and management regime. This study examines three 
approaches to fisheries co-management or participatory management in Antigua and Barbuda, from the perspective of a fisheries 
manager and a fisherfolk leader. The approaches identified with respect to co-management were: consultative (where government 
consult but have the final decision), collaborative (where government and stakeholders share decisions) and delegated co-
management (where government delegate powers to stakeholders to make decisions). Case studies were used to: 1) identify the most 
appropriate governance approach based on the nature of the fishery; 2) identify the necessary conditions for successful implementa-
tion of a co-management system; and 3) examine the effectiveness and cost efficiency (where possible) of the various approaches. 
Some of the main lessons learned were: 1) the absence of strong fisherfolk cooperatives or associations makes it difficult for the 
central management authority to devolve its power; 2) general decline in community structure and institutions of local governance 
(e.g., village councils) create serious challenges to the implementation of a co-management system; and 3) the size of a community 
has implications for cost efficiency and effectiveness (in terms of compliance with management decisions), in the implementation of 
a delegated co-management system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Antigua and Barbuda, the Fisheries Division is the lead governmental agency responsible for fisheries management 
and development. The Division is headed by the Chief Fisheries Officer, who reports directly to the Permanent Secretary of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Lands, Housing and the Environment. The mission of the Division is to ensure that develop-
ment in the fisheries sector occurs in a manner which is sustainable and capable of contributing its full potential to the 
overall development of the national economy. 
Whilst the Fisheries Division is the primary management authority, the Barbuda Local Government Act (1976), gives 
the local council of the island of Barbuda, authority to manage its fisheries. Barbuda Fisheries is the implementing arm of 
the Barbuda Council with regards to fisheries management and development. The Fisheries Act, No.14 of 1983 and the 
Fisheries Regulations, No.10 of 1990, are currently the primary legislative basis for fisheries management and development. 
The Act also makes provision for the designation of local fisheries management authority. These pieces of legislation are 
expected to be repealed shortly with the coming into force of new legislation; the substantive legislation, the Fisheries Act, 
No. 22 of 2006, has being passed by Parliament and will be enacted along with the draft amended Fisheries Regulations 
(2012) shortly. The provisions for devolution of governance to local council or local fisheries management authority are 
also enshrined in the new legislation. 
Over the past decades there have been gradual shifts in fisheries governance in Antigua and Barbuda from one that is 
“top-down” and centralised to one that is “participatory” and devolved. The term fisheries governance is used since 
“management” of fisheries is increasingly being replaced by the broader concept of “governance” (Jentoft 2006), which 
incorporates the social and political sciences in addition to the traditional, natural sciences. This shift in governance comes 
from the recognition of the potential benefits to be gained from greater involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making 
and management regime. Some of the potential benefits include: increase understanding of management decisions; improve 
compliance by user groups; mitigate user conflicts; improve relationship with stakeholders; and increase effectiveness of 
fisheries governance.  
The participation of stakeholders in fisheries governance is fundamental to the concept of co-management. While it has 
been decades since Jentoft (1989) introduced the concept of co-management and define it as a meeting point between 
overall government concerns for efficient resource utilisation and protection, and local concern for equal opportunity, self-
determination, and self-control, the concept is relatively new in the Caribbean region. One exception is the island of 
Barbuda, where the inhabitants have practised a community-based form of co-management dating back to the 1970s. 
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METHODS 
This study examines three approaches to fisheries co-
management or what the Caribbean Natural Resources 
Institute (2011) may term participatory management in 
Antigua and Barbuda, from the perspective of a fisheries 
manager and a fisherfolk leader. The co-management 
approaches identified (according to definitions by Pomeroy 
et al. 2003) were:  
i) Consultative – where government consults but 
have the final decision, 
ii) Collaborative – where government and stakehold-
ers share decisions, and  
iii) Delegated co-management – where government 
delegate powers to stakeholders to make deci-
sions. 
 
Case studies were used to:  
i) Identify the most appropriate governance 
approach based on the nature of the fishery, 
ii) Identify the necessary conditions for successful 
implementation of a co-management system, and 
iii) Examine the effectiveness and cost efficiency 
(where possible) of the various approaches.  
 
The following sources of data were used to evaluate 
the various co-management approaches with respect to the 
fore mentioned: annual budget reports from the Ministry of 
Finance; work programmes of the various fisheries 
management authorities; and compliance rates regarding 
fisheries regulations. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Case Study (Consultative Co-management): Fisheries 
Advisory Committee (FAC) in Antigua and Barbuda 
Under Section 4(3) of the Fisheries Act, No.14 of 
1983, the Chief Fisheries Officer is lawfully required to 
consult with stakeholders in the preparation and review of 
fisheries management and development plan. The Act also 
makes provision for a Fisheries Advisory Committee 
(FAC) to advise the Minister on the management and 
development of fisheries. It should be noted that the 
establishment of the FAC is not mandatory; the legislation 
merely empowers the Minister to appoint one. The general 
consensus in the fisheries sector is that this provision 
should be mandatory and not left to the discretion of the 
Minister. A series of local fishfolk meetings (three in 
Antigua and one in Barbuda), held under the theme “fishers 
participation in sustainable governance” reaffirmed this 
position (Lay 2012). While certain legal luminaries have 
argued that under the Westminster system of government 
under which Antigua and Barbuda operates, certain powers 
of the Minister is discretionary, legislation from other 
islands that operate under the same Westminster system 
contradict this line of argument. For example, Barbados 
Fisheries Act (1993) states that “the Minister shall by 
instruction in writing, appoint a committee to be called a 
Fisheries Advisory Committee to advise him on the 
development and management of fisheries”.  While some 
may argue that the Chief Fisheries Officer is still legally 
required to consult with stakeholders, thereby ensuring 
stakeholder participation, the Coordinator of the Caribbean 
Network of Fisherfolk Organisation (Lay 2012) considers 
it crucial to have a dedicated legal mechanism (or space) 
for fisherfolk participation in the governance process. A 
dedicated mechanism is also important to serve as a 
repository for institutional memory given the importance of 
hindsight to the development of institutions. Note in 
contrast to Antigua and Barbuda and other sovereign 
Member States of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS), the Chief Fisheries Officer under the 
Barbados Fisheries Act (1993) is not legally required to 
consult with stakeholders in the preparation and review of 
fisheries management and development schemes (the 
provision states may). 
The first FAC was established in Antigua and Barbuda 
in 1985 and appointed members served for a period of 
normally two years. The first Committee was chaired by 
the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture 
since it was felt that this would raise the status of the FAC 
and facilitate a more effective communication with the 
Minister. Between 1985 and 1990, the composition of the 
FAC varied widely (at one time 12 members), due to the 
problem of finding legitimate representation of profession-
al fisherfolks; the local cooperatives or associations lacked 
sufficient membership to legitimise their views as the 
views of the majority of fisherfolks. For this reason, 
fisherfolk nominees on the FAC were not limited to the 
membership of such organisations. With the passage of the 
Fisheries Regulations, No.10 of 1990, the composition and 
the functioning of the FAC was elaborated. According to 
Section 3(2) of the Regulations, the FAC shall consist of 
the following:  
i) A Chairman, who shall be appointed by the 
Minister,  
ii) A Deputy Chairman, who shall be appointed by 
the Minister,  
iii) The Chief Fisheries Officer or his representative, 
who shall be the Secretary,  
iv) Three persons nominated by professional 
fishermen and appointed by the Minister to 
represent the views of professional fishermen, and 
v) Two other persons, one of whom shall be a 
woman to be appointed by the Minister.  
 
With a membership of eight and quorum of four 
(including the Chairman or in his absence the Deputy 
Chairman and the Secretary), decisions made by the FAC 
was based on consensus-building (Fisheries Division 
1998). It was felt that voting was counter-productive to the 
harmony of the Committee in the long run. 
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The functioning of the FAC under Section 4 of the 
Regulations include advising the Minister on: fisheries 
management and development (including review of any 
plan); the need for any amendment to the Act or any 
Regulations; any proposals for access agreements, joint 
venture or development projects; any initiative for regional 
harmonisation of fisheries regimes; coordination of the 
policies and activities with respect to any of the fore 
mentioned; conditions to be imposed and the fees to be 
paid for any licence under the Regulations; and any other 
matter the Minister may assign. Since the formation of the 
Committee in 1985, its greatest achievement to-date is that 
it successfully presided over the passage of the Fisheries 
Regulations (1990). The work done by a Technical 
Advisory Committee (TAC) of the FAC, in reviewing the 
piece of legislation, was instrumental to its enactment. The 
FAC has the option of establishing, maintaining and 
appointing members of a TAC to advice on fisheries 
management and development (Fisheries Division 1998).  
The FAC functioned until the 31 December 1995, 
when the last set of appointments expired. Over the years, 
there has been a lack of political will to revive the FAC 
despite several attempts by the Chief Fisheries Officer and 
various fisherfolks organisations (Cheryl Jeffrey-Appleton, 
Antigua and Barbuda Fisheries Division, Personal commu-
nication). The Antigua and Barbuda Fishermen’s Alliance, 
an umbrella organisation comprised of members from 
various cooperatives, associations, informal groups and 
businesses, strongly recommended that the Government re-
establishes the Committee following its General Meeting 
of 27th March, 2001 (Mitchell Lay, Antigua and Barbuda 
Fishermen’s Alliance, Personal communication). This 
recommendation was reiterated in 2004 following a change 
in Government (Mitchell Lay, Antigua and Barbuda 
Fishermen’s Alliance, Personal communication). 
Despite the fore mentioned legal achievement, the 
FAC did not function as an effective mechanism for 
consultative co-management during its existence. Possible 
reasons for the failure of this legal space for fisherfolks to 
participate in decision-making include:  
i) Weak legislative mandate for the FAC existence 
(i.e., its establishment is discretionary),  
ii) The perception of patronage politics with respect 
to representation on the FAC (i.e., perceived 
political allegiance have delegitimise stakeholder 
representation in certain cases),  
iii) Inadequate accountability and transparency in the 
operations of the FAC (the FAC generally did not 
seek consensus from industry or provide regular 
feedback to stakeholders),  
iv) Inadequate accountability and transparency by 
fisherfolk representatives (this may be related to 
the fact that members are appointed in a personal 
capacity), and  
v) The relative low status of the FAC in relation to 
other government advisory bodies (this is possibly 
a reflection of the status of fisheries in the overall 
economy and perhaps the agriculture sector). 
  
If re-established, the FAC could function better as a 
mechanism for stakeholder participation if the following 
actions are taken:  
i) Mandatory establishment of the FAC enshrined in 
law,  
ii) Incorporate a provision to consult with stakehold-
ers in the FAC legal mandate,  
iii) Transition stakeholder membership to representa-
tion by organisation as the first option for 
selection,  
iv) Incorporate provisions related to accountability 
and transparency in the FAC legal mandate, and 
v) Ensure members of the FAC are adequately 
trained in areas such as consensus decision-
making and participatory planning to better 
facilitate the participatory process.  
 
These steps could also transition the FAC towards a 
collaborative co-management mechanism. 
In the absence of a formal and dedicated mechanism 
for advocacy on the part of fisherfolks since 1995, various 
fishfolk organisations and informal groups have filled the 
void in addressing critical issues that affect the sector. For 
example, an informal group called the Concerned Fisher-
men of Antigua and Barbuda was formed in 1996 in 
response to:  
i) Increase illegal fishing by foreign vessels (mainly 
vessels from Guadeloupe) in Antigua and 
Barbuda’s waters,  
ii) The possibility that the Government may enter 
negotiations with France concerning the granting 
of fishing rights to Guadeloupean fishermen in 
Antigua and Barbuda’s waters, and  
iii) The possible negative impact additional fishing 
effort would have on the status of the fishery 
resources and ultimately their livelihood. A 
petition bearing the signatures of 418 fishers 
(about 50% of the active fishers in Antigua and 
Barbuda) was sent to the Minister of Fisheries and 
the Honourable Prime Minister, in protest of the 
proposed negotiations. The Government followed 
the directives of the fishers and the possibility of 
an access agreement as the solution for illegal 
fishing by foreign vessels was withdrawn. 
 
In January of 1997, members from the Concerned 
Fishermen of Antigua and Barbuda, the Antigua and 
Barbuda Fishermen’s Association, the St. John’s Fisher-
men’s Co-operative, the Antigua and Barbuda Sports 
Fishing Association, the Antigua Commercial Fishing 
Divers, and various SCUBA dive shops, united under a 
voluntary organisation called the Antigua and Barbuda 
Fishermen’s Alliance. Some of the main aims of the 
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Alliance (Lay and Price 1997) were: to represent its 
members and member organisations at the national level 
on all matters pertaining to the fishing industry of Antigua 
and Barbuda; to present a unified approach in all matters 
affecting fisheries and the livelihood of fishermen; to 
encourage and aid localised fishing organisations in order 
to achieve unity of purpose, provide support and represen-
tation at a local level; and to fully cooperate with the 
Fisheries Department on all fisheries matters, including 
conservation, resource management, fisheries policy, 
safety at sea, etc. Two main issues the Alliance have 
provided advocacy on were the dredging project for St. 
John’s Harbour (the main seaport in Antigua) and price 
control on fish. The issue concerning the proposed 
dredging of St. John’s Harbour in 2001 related to the 
possible negative impact dumping of dredged silt at sea 
would have on the marine environment, fisheries and the 
dive sector. The Alliance was somewhat successful in 
influencing the selection of the marine site for dumping by 
identifying important fishing grounds; originally, the 
Alliance lobbied for a land-based disposal of the dredge 
material. The Alliance also monitored the disposal process 
at sea (Fishermen raise concerns 2001). In terms of price 
control on fish, the Alliance was successful in convincing 
the Government that market forces should dictate the ex-
vessel price for fish after the Government proposed re-
introducing price control (Lay 2001). Since that time 
various fisherfolk organisations, such as the Antigua and 
Barbuda Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. (formerly 
the St. John’s Fishermen Co-operative), have let market 
forces such as changes in fuel price dictate the ex-vessel 
price of fish (Consumers pay more for fish 2007). In 2012, 
Government entered into negotiations with the Antigua 
and Barbuda Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd., in an 
attempt to keep the cost of seafood down given its 
importance to national food security. It was negotiated that 
the West Indian Oil Company (a company that the 
Government has 25% shares) would sell fuel to Co-
operative members at a cost that does not include the 
Government’s consumption tax provided that members 
agree to abide by fisheries policies outlined by the 
Fisheries Division and members’ contribution to national 
schemes (social security, medical benefits and educational 
levy) were current (Barnes 2012). 
Figure 1 summarises the decision-making process with 
respect to fisheries management and development during 
the existence of the FAC. In the process, the FAC served a 
crucial role at the appraisal stage, prior to public review of 
fisheries management or development plans. The FAC was 
also responsible for periodic evaluation of approved 
fisheries management or development plans. In the 
absence of the FAC as a formal mechanism for stakeholder 
participation, the Chief Fisheries Officer was legally 
obligated to look at other avenues to consult with stake-
holders. This ranged from town-hall meetings to annual 
fisheries symposiums (an annual feedback mechanism for 
the department work). In 2004, the decision-making 
process was formally modified (Figure 2) to support the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
sponsored review of draft fisheries legislation. In the 
absence of the FAC for appraisal, fisherfolk organisations, 
environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and other key stakeholders appraised the draft legislation 
(Figure 2). This process represented the first time that 
stakeholder participation in the process formally extended 
beyond that of fisherfolks, in the case of the environmental 
NGOs. An additional stage, final review, followed the 
public sessions whereby nominees from the public sessions 
were selected to an ad hoc fisheries focus group (Figure 2) 
for final review of the draft before submission to the 
Minister. This was considered important towards ensuring 
that the final draft was “balanced” and represented the 
views of all stakeholders through their active participation 
in the final review. While this process of decision-making 
was longer than under the FAC, it appears to be favoured 
more by fisherfolks and their organisations, in that input is 
sorted earlier in the process (at appraisal as oppose to 
public review), and it allowed for greater consultation at 
the grass-root level and within fisherfolk organisations. 
The process was also considered more “open” and less 
rigid than that of the FAC, in that nominees for the 
fisheries focus group came directly from the fisherfolk 
organisations and the general attendees at the public 
sessions, without the requirement of approval and appoint-
ment by the Minister. As with the FAC, decisions were 
based on consensus-building. The review of the draft 
legislation also marked the first time that the Web was 
used as a feedback mechanism for the wider community 
(i.e., both current and proposed legislation were posted on 
the Fisheries Division’s website). In terms of the future of 
the current process, any re-establishment of the FAC 
mechanism should incorporate the best practises of the 
current process. 
 
Case Study (Collaborative Co-management): Fisheries 
Division and Conch Fishers from the South Coast of 
Antigua 
The queen conch (Strombus gigas) is considered one 
of the most valuable and important fishery resources in the 
Caribbean region. This is due to export earnings, consump-
tion within the tourism sector, employment, and income 
generated from local sales. Throughout the region 
management measures for queen conch include minimum 
size restrictions, close seasons, closures, harvest quotas, 
gear / vessel restrictions, and limited entry.  Despite these 
measures, fear of depleted conch resource has prompted 
the queen conch to be included under Appendix II of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1992. Hence interna-
tional trade in queen conch or parts thereof (meat, souvenir 
shells, etc.) are regulated by CITES and subject to the 
provisions of the Convention.  
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The need for collaboration was paramount due to:   
i) The small nature of the fishery (in 1999 the 
fishery supported about 40 fishers from the south 
coast of Antigua), and  
ii) The limited human and financial resource of the 
fisheries department.  
 
Antigua and Barbuda acceded to the Convention 
in 1997. The first CITES Review of Significant Trade of 
queen conch in 1995 resulted in a 1999 recommendation 
by the CITES Standing Committee to suspend imports of 
conch from Antigua and Barbuda, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Barbados, Dominica and St. Lucia (CITES 1999, Theile 
2001). This was the direct result of Parties failing to 
respond to the recommendations of the CITES Animals 
Committee (basically a committee of experts that provide 
advice on species subject to CITES trade controls). 
Against this milieu, the shift towards collaborative co-
management started in 1999 in an effort to improve overall 
governance of the conch fishery as well as fulfil CITES 
obligations. Originally, the governance approach was 
“consultative”, however as CITES obligations grew as a 
result of the declining status of the resource regionally, it 
was realised that only through collaboration could all 
parties (fisheries managers and conch fishers) achieve the 
desired goal of sustainability (in terms of resource status 
and international trade).  
FORMULATION / REVISION 
Fisheries Division (FD) formulates or revises Fisheries 
Management & Development Plan (FMDP) 
APPRAISAL 
Fisheries Advisory Committee (FAC) appraises Draft 
FMDP 
PUBLIC REVIEW 
Draft FMDP reviewed by persons involved in the fish-
ing industry and other stakeholders 
APPROVAL 
Minister review the Final Draft and approves the FMDP 
IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 
FMDP is implemented and monitoring through various 
administrative and regulatory means 
EVALUATION 
FMDP is periodically evaluated by FD, FAC, stakehold-
ers and through public review 
Figure 1. Former fisheries management and development 
decision-making process for Antigua and Barbuda 
(Fisheries Division 1998). 
FORMULATION / REVISION 
Fisheries Division (FD) formulates or revises Fisheries 
Management & Development Plan (FMDP) 
APPRAISAL 
Fisherfolk organisations, NGOs and other stakeholders 
appraise FMDP 
PUBLIC REVIEW 
Draft FMDP reviewed by persons involved in the fish-
ing industry and other stakeholders 
APPROVAL 
Minister review the Final Draft and approves the FMDP 
IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 
FMDP is implemented and monitoring through various 
administrative means 
EVALUATION 
FMDP is periodically evaluated by FD, stakeholders and 
through public review (usually annual fisheries symposi-
FINAL REVIEW 
Draft FMDP reviewed by fisheries focus group com-
prised of nominees from fisherfolk organisations and 
public review 
Figure 2. Current fisheries management and development 
decision-making process for Antigua and Barbuda since 
2004. 
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With CITES sanctions in effect, the collaborative 
process started first in the areas of:  
i) Data collection, where the majority of fishers 
readily provided data (catch and effort, conch 
biological, traditional knowledge, etc.), and 
ii) Compliance with regulations, in 1999 the 
noncompliance rate was 1.3% based on random 
sampling of conch meat from registered vessels 
(Horsford 2004).  
 
Despite these improvements, the second (2001) CITES 
Review of Significant Trade resulted in Antigua and 
Barbuda listed as a range State of “possible concern” along 
with 12 other countries (CITES 2003); hence trade 
suspension for conch remained in effect. 
In 2004, collaborative co-management was first 
achieved by consensus with a negotiated two months 
closed season for conch during the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) sponsored review of 
draft fisheries legislation. Initially, the Fisheries Division 
proposed a four-month closed season, in line with other 
regulations in the region, however only two months were 
supported due to the relative good health of the stocks 
(Horsford 2004) and the impact of a concurrent closed 
season for the Caribbean spiny lobster (the alternate target 
species for conch divers). Hence the draft amended 
Fisheries Regulations (2012), to be enacted shortly, states 
that the closed season shall commence from 1st July to 
31st August of every year until otherwise declared by the 
Minister in the Gazette. In May 2006, the collaborative 
approach bore fruit, with CITES notifying the international 
trade community that Antigua and Barbuda had satisfied 
CITES requirements, and the trade sanctions for conch 
were lifted (CITES 2006). 
In 2011 and 2012, the collaboration extended to 
include the active participation of conch fishers in fisheries 
research. This was in response to the rising costs associated 
with managing a CITES Appendix II species. The results 
of the two studies were presented at the 64th and 65th Gulf 
and Caribbean Fisheries Institute conferences and were 
used to guide conch management regime. The active 
participation of fishers in the research allowed for greater 
“buy-in” with respect to management decisions regarding 
measures such as limited entry, minimum shell lip 
thickness and closed season. 
The shift in governance to collaborative has led to: 
increase understanding of management decisions; improve 
compliance by conch fishers; and increase effectiveness 
and cost efficiency of fisheries governance. For the past 
decade, the mean rate of compliance regarding conch size 
restrictions was 88% (Horsford 2010). Other factors that 
possibly contributed to the success of this governance 
approach included: the small and homogenous nature of 
the fishery (this reduced the likelihood of user conflicts 
related to gear or insider-outsider perception); and fishers 
came from communities with a history of social and 
environmental activism (in 2001, residents of the Old Road 
Village community barricaded streets in an effort to stop 
the construction of a multi-million dollar tourism project 
that threatened a mangrove system). 
The success of collaborative co-management with 
conch fishers has nurtured other partnerships arrangements 
between Fisheries Division and other fisherfolk organisa-
tions. For example, the Fisheries Division has collaborated 
with the Caribbean Network of Fisherfolk Organisation 
(CNFO) in the area of educating fishers on the FAO Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the Ecosystem 
Approach to Fisheries. This fisher teaching fisher initiative 
aimed at improving fisheries governance at the grass-root 
level was supported by FAO. The Fisheries Division is also 
currently in collaboration with the CNFO and FAO in the 
area of research, to support the assessment of the need for a 
national plan of action in regards to sharks (NPOA-
Sharks). 
 
Case Study (Delegated Co-management):  
Barbuda Local Council 
The legislative framework for delegated co-
management (in this case at the community level) was 
established in Barbuda with the passage of the Barbuda 
Local Government Act of 1976, prior to Antigua and 
Barbuda gaining independence from the United Kingdom 
in 1981. These legal provisions were maintained after 
independence. According to the Barbuda Local Govern-
ment Act, the elected Council of nine members and two 
parliamentary representatives (one for the Upper House 
and one for the Lower House of Parliament) have the 
authority: to administer fisheries (Part V, Section 4c); and 
powers to make by-laws concerning fishing and fish 
intended for human consumption (Part V, Sections 19[1] 
[xxxii] and [viii]). Barbuda has a long history of communi-
ty-based natural resource management dating back to the 
communal land rights of the Barbuda Act of 1904. Land in 
Barbuda is held in trust by the Council and subject to their 
by-laws, thus individuals may not hold title to any land in 
Barbuda. By-laws gazetted shall have full force and effect 
in Barbuda and shall only operate in addition to and not in 
derogation of any other law of Antigua and Barbuda. In 
term of the marine jurisdiction, the Barbuda Shooting and 
Fishing By-Law of 1959 states that it extends from inland 
waters, creeks and lagoons in the island of Barbuda and 
from waters surrounding the island extending one maritime 
league (3 nautical miles or 5.56 km) from the shores at low 
water ordinary spring tide. 
In Barbuda, the Council administers the local fisheries 
through a subcommittee comprised of representatives of 
the Council and other relevant stakeholders, with Barbuda 
Fisheries serving as the implementing arm of the Council. 
Major decisions concerning fisheries are made in open 
house sessions which may include voting if the issue is 
contentious. Two major issues the Council addressed in 
recent times include the review of the draft fisheries 
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legislation in 2004 and the proposed development of a 
Japanese-funded artisanal fisheries complex in Barbuda in 
2006. In terms of the legislative review, the Council 
lobbied for a position on the national Fisheries Advisory 
Committee (FAC) as well as for the nomination of a 
professional fisher from Barbuda. Hence the draft amended 
Fisheries Regulations (2012), to be enacted shortly, states 
that the FAC shall comprise of: a Chairman, who shall be 
appointed by the Minister; a deputy Chairman, who shall 
be appointed by the Minister; the Chief Fisheries Officer or 
his representative, who shall be the Secretary; three persons 
nominated by professional fishers and appointed by the 
Minister, one of whom shall be from Barbuda; a person to 
be appointed by the Minister; and a person to be nominated 
by the Barbuda Council. If the FAC is re-established (it is 
still subject to the Minister’s discretion), it will be the first 
time that the island of Barbuda has such a significant 
representation on the FAC (at least 25% of the member-
ship).  
In terms of the fisheries complex, the main issue had to 
do with the location of the facility. Originally the sites 
proposed by the technicians (included Fisheries Division), 
was for a large fish landing facility (dock and multipurpose 
building) located at River Wharf, outside of the main 
community, and a small landing facility (slipway, admin-
istration building, ice making and chill storage facilities) 
located in Codrington, where most individuals reside. 
Because Codrington, is bounded inside a lagoon with a 
narrow entrance that excludes large vessels and the 
ecological importance of the lagoon as a nursery area for 
fish and a breeding colony for birds, it was considered 
important to have facilities to accommodate larger fishing 
vessels elsewhere. However, after a number of town hall 
meetings organised by the Council in collaboration with the 
Fisheries Division, the general consensus of the attendees 
was that the entire facility should be housed in Codrington, 
despite the implications for large vessels. Construction of 
the Barbuda Fisheries Complex started in Codrington in 
March 2010 and the facility was formally opened in August 
2011. 
Van der Meerin (1998) in her assessment of manage-
ment and the decision-making process in Barbuda high-
lighted that although open house sessions were regularly 
held by the Council, management decisions should involve 
more active consultation with the residents through a series 
of village meetings. She is of the view that resource 
management is likely to meet with most success if it has 
the full understanding and backing of the relevant resource 
users and stakeholders. Other critical issues affecting co-
management in Barbuda include insufficient local technical 
capability and the short length of appointment of council 
members (under the Barbuda Local Government Act of 
1976, every two-years four or five members of the Council 
is retired from office but eligible for re-election). With a 
resident population of only 1,810 in 2011 (Statistics 
Division 2012) and few individuals trained in fisheries 
management or related fields, the Council is reliant on the 
Fisheries Division to provide additional technical expertise. 
The Council has been addressing the problem through 
attachments to build capacity as well as scholarship 
opportunities in the areas of fisheries and environmental 
management. The biennial election term of council 
members can impact on the continuity of policy and 
perhaps affect political will with respect to making difficult 
decisions (i.e., council member may be wary of making 
decisions that may affect their re-election in two years). 
Current Chairman of the Barbuda Council, Kelvin Punter, 
indicated that a biennial election term is no longer working 
out in the interest of the island and that a four-year term 
would be more suitable (Francis 2011a). He is of the 
opinion that two years is not enough time to complete 
projects you have started. Member of Parliament for 
Barbuda, Trevor Walker, sees the restructuring of the 
Council as being important towards improving its perfor-
mance and highlighted that the Council was operating in 
the 21st century with a 1970s Act (Walker says new model 
needed 2011). He is of the view that 11 council members is 
too large a number for governing approximately 2,000 
persons. Despite the fore mentioned, perhaps the most 
critical issue for effective delegated co-management and 
good governance overall, is the active participation of 
stakeholders. The somewhat limited participation of 
Barbudans in open house sessions and village meetings 
held by the Council is cause for concern. This is highlight-
ed by the fact that the most contentious issue that the 
Council has addressed in recent times, a US$100 million 
tourism project earmarked for the island’s south-east coast, 
saw only a turnout of 300 of the 1,143 registered voters 
(Francis 2011b), with only 102 participating in the voting 
process associated with approval of the project (More 
controversy over proposed Barbuda project 2011). This is 
in contrast to the Barbuda Council election of that year 
when 892 residents voted (Francis 2011b), a turnout of 
78%. In the case of consultation on the draft fisheries 
regulations in July of 2012, 30 fishers attended, despite the 
fact that there are 120 registered fishers in Barbuda and 
25.5% of the population is directly dependent on fishing 
(Horsford 1999). While residents are empowered in 
Barbuda, if they don’t exercise their rights through active 
participation, this power is meaningless. The challenge for 
the Council is getting the residents interested in governance 
beyond the election process. 
 
Cost Efficiency and Effectiveness of various forms of 
Fisheries Co-management 
Table 1 compares various forms of co-management in 
Antigua and Barbuda in terms of cost efficiency and 
effectiveness. The Barbuda Council, which has the most 
devolved approach to co-management and perhaps the most 
democratic (i.e., natives can determine the direction of 
management or development by indicting to the Council 
through show of hands), spent five times more than the 
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national authority on fisheries management per vessel. The 
cost of fisheries management per fisher in Barbuda was 
also eight times that of Antigua, despites having a more 
artisanal fishery. While management costs per vessel and 
per fisher were greater in Barbuda, it did not translate into 
higher levels of compliance with fisheries management 
measures, even with a more empowered citizenry. For 
example, the level of compliance with respect to licensing 
of local vessels in Barbuda was only about a third of that 
of Antigua (62% in Antigua as opposed to 23% in 
Barbuda). Under the Barbuda Local Government Act 
(1976), the Barbuda Council has the right to raise and 
collect revenues to meet its expenses (this include fees 
from local fishing licences and lobster exports). 
Reasons for the relatively high management cost per 
unit in Barbuda include:  
i) The high cost of interisland travel and other 
expenses related to fisheries administration (i.e., 
certain fisheries service require oversight by the 
national authority),  
ii) The high cost of living as a result of the fact that 
all goods bear additional transportation costs 
(fishing inputs have to be shipped from Antigua), 
and  
iii) With limited local technical capability in areas 
such as fisheries management, services have to be 
sought from Antigua.  
 
For Barbuda, enforcement of fisheries rules have been 
problematic due to:  
i) Individuals tend to be related (family, friend or 
neighbour),  
ii) Limited revenue stream for enforcement due to 
the small size of the community (resident 
population only 1,810 in 2011 (Statistics Division 
2012)), and  
iii) Conflict of interest (fisheries officers and 
enforcement personnel are likely to have a vested 
interest in fishing or fisheries related activities).  
 
With fishing being the highest per capita earner in 
Barbuda (Van der Meerin 1998) and 25.5% of the 
population directly dependent on fishing (Horsford 1999), 
it is difficult to avoid a conflict of interest. These results 
raise further questions about the effectiveness of enforce-
ment by stakeholders in small, close-knit communities and 
the impact community size has on cost efficiency (in terms 
of economics of scale) in a community-based co-
management system. 
Note in 2011, the compliance rate for local licensing 
in Barbuda improved to levels similar to Antigua due to 
external factors governing lobster exports to neighbouring 
French overseas territories. This was the direct result of 
implementing a catch certification programme for fishery 
exports (Horsford 2010); European Council Regulations 
(EC 1005/2008 and EC 1010/2009) requires all fishing 
products entering the European Union to be certified by 
the Flag State as having been caught legally. To improve 
compliance overall, Antigua and Barbuda Plan of Action 
to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated fishing was implemented in 2010 following a 
consultative process with stakeholders (Horsford 2010). 
 
 
Table 1. Cost efficiency and effectiveness of various forms of fisheries co-management in Antigua and Barbuda (Fisheries 
Division Unpublished data, Budget Department 2012, Barbuda Council 2012). Note the cost of fisheries surveillance and 
enforcement by the coast guard was not included since activities covered the entire marine jurisdiction . 
  Fisheries Co-management Approach 
  
Consultative 
(exceptions include management of marine 
protected areas and conch fishery) 
 
Delegated and community based 
  
  
 
Management authority 
Scope of governance 
No. of active fishing vessels in 2010 
No. of active fishers in 2010 
Cost of fisheries management in 2010 
Cost of fisheries management per active 
vessel in 2010 
Cost of fisheries management per active 
fisher in 2010 
Level of compliance with respect to licens-
ing of local vessel in 2010 
 
Fisheries Division 
National (Antigua and Barbuda) 
357 
894 
EC$491,030 (US$181,863) 
EC$1,375 per vessel (US$509 per vessel) 
  
EC$549 per fisher (US$203 per fisher) 
  
62.2% 
 
Barbuda Council 
Local (Barbuda) 
31 
50 
EC$228,909 (US$84,781) 
EC$7,384 per vessel (US$2,735 per ves-
sel) 
  
EC$4,578 per fisher (US$1,696 per fisher) 
  
22.6% 
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CONCLUSION 
In the review of the various forms of co-management 
in Antigua and Barbuda, the main lessons learned were as 
follows: 
i) The absence of strong fisherfolk cooperatives or 
associations makes it difficult for the central 
management authority to devolve its power or 
capitalise on the resources of these institutions to 
improve overall fisheries governance. Hence 
strengthening of the governance of these institu-
tions is vital for a successful co-management 
system. 
ii) A general decline in community structure, 
community “spirit” and traditional institutions of 
local governance (such as village councils) has 
created serious challenges to the implementation 
of a co-management system. This is due to the 
fact that these traditional community structures 
provide the ideal nexus and foundation to support 
a co-management system. With the shift to 
centralised governance following Antigua and 
Barbuda gaining independence in 1981, citizens 
have grown accustom to delegating their responsi-
bilities to elected officials as oppose to being 
active participants in the governance process. This 
is illustrated by the somewhat limited participa-
tion of Barbudans in village meetings held by the 
local council, despite having an empowered 
citizenry (i.e., natives can determine the fate of 
contentious management or development issues 
by voting). 
iii) The size of a community has implications for cost 
efficiency (i.e., economics of scale) and effective-
ness, in terms of compliance with management 
decisions. In the case of the conch fishers from 
the south coast of Antigua, cost efficiency and 
effectiveness of fisheries governance was 
improved through the active participation of the 
stakeholders in the governance process from 
research to decision-making. 
 
In terms of future development of co-management 
systems in Antigua and Barbuda greater emphasis will 
have to be placed on fostering the critical skills required by 
fisheries managers and fisherfolk leaders to facilitate the co
-management process. While training in the natural 
sciences is an important aspect of traditional fisheries 
management, co-management requires equivalent focus on 
the social sciences (including political science) since it 
actively seeks consensus on management decisions as well 
as “empower” stakeholders (Jentoft 2005). The importance 
of social values, interests and power, as well as the 
procedural aspects, such as the representation and partici-
pation of stakeholders in the fisheries management process 
have been highlighted by Jentoft (2006). Hence training in 
areas such as consensus decision-making, conflict 
mediation, stakeholder identification and analysis, and 
participatory planning (including monitoring and evalua-
tion) is becoming vital. Institutions such as the Centre for 
Resource Management and Environmental Studies 
(University of the West Indies) and the Caribbean Natural 
Resources Institute have been filling the knowledge gap in 
the Caribbean by training resource managers and fisherfolk 
leaders in these skills. 
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